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The legislature and agenda politics of social welfare:
a comparative analysis of authoritarian and democratic
regimes in South Korea
Jaemin Shim
German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany
ABSTRACT
The article mainly seeks to explain the legislature’s preferences in social welfare before
and after democratization using South Korea as a case study. Based on an original
dataset that consists of all executive and of legislative branch-submitted bills
between 1948 and 2016 – roughly 60,000– legislative priority on social welfare is
compared over time, and tested using logistic regressions. The key focus of analysis
is whether and how the level of democracy aﬀected the degree and universality of
social welfare priority. The ﬁndings show that the promotion of social welfare is
positively related to higher levels of democracy in a continuous fashion, which
clearly points to the need to avoid applying a simple regime dichotomy –
authoritarian or democratic – when seeking to understand social welfare
development. Going further, the article examines the legislature’s priority in welfare
issues within a presidential structure and under majoritarian electoral rule, at
diﬀerent levels of democracy. The result shows that the higher levels of democracy
are, the more the legislative branch contributes to the overall salience of social
welfare legislative initiatives as compared to the executive branch. Moreover, the
legislative branch itself prioritizes a social welfare agenda – alongside democratic
deepening – over other issues.
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Introduction
The positive impact of democratization and multiparty competition on welfare expan-
sion has been a widely accepted ﬁnding.1 On this, and using an integrated framework
between authoritarian and democratic regimes, De Mesquita and others ﬁnd the
increasing level of democracy to be a key political condition for political elites providing
goods and services to a wider range of people.2 That is, diﬀerent levels of democracy are
treated as political conditions – ones with varying institutional incentives – to provide
diﬀerent degrees of a public–private goods mixture.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-
tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Jaemin Shim jaemin.shim@giga-hamburg.de, jamesshim83@gmail.com
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1621847.
DEMOCRATIZATION
2019, VOL. 26, NO. 7, 1235–1255
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1621847
Going beyond the existing approach, the article considers both successful and failed
welfare attempts, who speciﬁcally supports each attempt, and how their role has changed
at diﬀerent democratic levels. Because the authoritarian welfare scholarship has focused
on expenditure or a few landmark pieces of legislation, many of the unsuccessful or less
salient legislative attempts regarding social welfare emanating from marginalized actors
such as opposition party members have hitherto gone unnoticed.3 Furthermore, due to
the lack of data availability, information onwhich speciﬁc political actors in the government
supported particular social welfare initiatives has not been systematically scrutinized. For
instance, when Knutsen and Rasmussen measured “the degree of pension universality”
in autocracies, they based their study on eight groups but were uncertain about whether
the key ones of interest to their paper – civil servants and the military – were included.4
Finally, even if the authoritarian legislature started to be noticed as a point of policy com-
promises, there has still not beenmuch attention paid to how speciﬁc institutional arrange-
ments – for example majoritarian electoral rules or presidential constitutional structures –
can aﬀect the social welfare agenda within an autocratic legislature.
In this article, I examine the changes in the legislative prioritization of social welfare
issues in South Korea (henceforth, Korea) between 1948 and 2016. Korea is an ideal case
to test how the diﬀerent political actors’ policy preferences on social welfare issues have
changed along with the deepening of democracy for the following reasons. First, over
the past 70 years, the country has experienced diﬀerent levels of democracy over
time (from 0 to 0.84 by annual Polyarchy score5 in Figure 1) and, at the same time,
the degree of legislative priority given to social welfare issues has also shifted substan-
tially over time (from 0 to 27% according to the annual welfare bill sponsorship pro-
portion that I calculated based on the ensuing deﬁnition thereof). Second, because
Korea consistently allowed legislative initiatives to be taken by both the executive
and legislative branches during the period of observation (this is not the norm in
other countries; for instance, the executive branch cannot sponsor bills in the United
States), it provides a unique opportunity to examine the changing priorities of presi-
dents – both dictatorial and democratically elected ones – and legislatures over the
degree and types of social welfare issue prioritization at diﬀerent levels of democracy.6
Third, the whole universe of both successful and unsuccessful bills submitted since 1948
is publicly available, and from this I built an original welfare bill sponsorship dataset.
Fourth, because the country consistently had strong majoritarian electoral rules and
a presidential constitutional structure during the period of observation7, we can
Figure 1. Change of Democracy and Legislative Independence Levels in Korea. Source: Polyarchy and Legislative
Constraints indicators by Varieties of Democracy.
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further our insights into how political actors’ social welfare preferences changes with
democratic deepening within these speciﬁc institutional arrangements.
By analysing legislation patterns over time, I demonstrate that the legislative branch
has steadily been more median voter-oriented than the executive branch in Korea.
Moreover, under majoritarian electoral rules, lower levels of constraint through
greater democratization (illustrated in the legislative constraint score8 in Figure 1)
have led the legislative branch to increasingly prioritize and contribute to the overall
saliency of social welfare issues. The article is organized as follows: First, after a brief
introduction of the previous literature on social welfare expansion and the role of the
legislature in authoritarian regimes, I will derive related testable hypotheses. Second,
the article will point out political contexts in Korea and then specify how welfare
bills (and universal welfare bills) are deﬁned. Finally, both descriptive statistics and
regression analyses are employed to examine the eﬀect of democracy level on social
welfare agenda promotion, as well as the legislative mechanism behind it.
Theory, Korean context and data
Social welfare expansion in authoritarian and democratic regimes
It has been repeatedly pointed out in the social policy literature that authoritarian
regimes do not necessary avoid providing public goods. In addition to Bismarck’s util-
ization of social policy in imperial Germany– which is often identiﬁed as the origin of
the modern welfare state – the majority of social welfare programmes were in fact intro-
duced by authoritarian regimes.9 Moreover, several other empirical works have revealed
that authoritarian regimes can extend welfare eﬀorts under particular conditions – for
example a favourable economic situation – and/or with particular motivations, such as:
i) to control strategically important groups like the military or the government bureauc-
racy or ii) to pre-empt potential social unrest.10
However, ceteris paribus, higher levels of democracy aremore likely to lead to the pro-
vision of public goods; empirical ﬁndings drawn from a large number of countries have
demonstrated this, by showing that welfare spending increases in tandem with franchise
extensions.11 The following political logics have been pointed out in explaining the posi-
tive impact of democratization on social welfare expansionmeanwhile: On the one hand,
mass enfranchisement can be approached as a tipping point that is qualitatively diﬀerent
from authoritarian rule. For instance Marshall points out that after achieving civil rights
and political rights, people will then ask for social rights too – based on their now more
socio-economically substantive understanding of democratic citizenship.12 Similarly,
mass enfranchisement can be a critical turning point since it indicates expansion of
the franchise to the poor – and the median voter in this context will ask for greater
wealth sharing in light of typically right-skewed income distribution.13
On the other hand, there is an integrated approach that views social welfare pro-
vision between authoritarian and democratic regimes respectively on a continuous
scale. De Mesquita and others’ work is an exemplary case;14 they argue that, even
though there will be mixture of public and private goods for any regime type, higher
levels of public goods provision are expected to occur in line with the upward pro-
gression of the democratic level. This for the following reason: Leaders in authoritarian
regimes are supported by a winning coalition – an indispensable core group that keeps
these leaders in power – and goods and services thus have to be provided to prevent the
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defection of its members, which can result in the overthrowing of those leaders. Even
though leaders naturally prefer to keep onside only a small circle of winning coalition
members so as to maximize their own share of power, if the coalition becomes too big to
be maintained by private goods alone then they can mix more public goods into the
deal. In other words, although political elites are likely to provide goods and services
to a wider range of people after mass enfranchisement – meaning when that winning
coalition becomes over 50% of those involved – there can still be varying degrees of
public goods provision across authoritarian regimes too.
Taking a cue from the integrated approach, the relationship between private and
public goods provision can be understood on a continuous scale; we can therefore
argue that the lower a country’s level of democracy, the greater the level of goods that
will be provided privately. Core supporters of the regime will be key beneﬁciaries of
these private goods and usually they include organized groups with identiﬁable features:
ruling party members, soldiers, land owners, civil servants, teachers, industrial workers,
business groups and the like.15 Because these groups retracting their support can increase
the chance of regime collapse or leadership change, a wide range of private goods tend to
be provided to them. These can take either a directmaterial form – such as fertilizers, sub-
sidized housing, constructionmaterials, food – or amore indirect one – for example regu-
latory favours, policy inﬂuence, access to economic rents, political posts16– albeit with
material implications. By and large, these private goods are discretionary distributions
that do not take the form of formal social welfare (see online appendix for a detailed dis-
tinction between formal and informal social welfare). Therefore, with regards to the levels
of democracy, the following hypothesis can be derived:
H1: The higher the level of democracy, the more formal social welfare will be.
However, more formal forms of beneﬁts have their unique advantages, and are often
used by autocrats. Discretionary distributions are more informal and, because of
their quid pro quo nature, theoretical challenges have been raised about the credibility
of future commitments by dictators.17 In contrast, as pointed out by Knutsen and Ras-
mussen18, formal social welfare is likely to be transparent, predictable and irreversible
compared to other discretionary spending; this can mitigate the ‘credible commitment’
problem for the autocrat. Besides, even though it is recognized as public spending,
formal social welfare can be treated as private goods since it can be targeted towards
particular core groups. Resonating with this logic, the evidence demonstrates that tar-
geted pension programmes tend to reduce the probability of autocratic regime break-
down.19 Combining this ﬁnding with the key thesis of De Mesquita and others20,
higher levels of democracy require a larger minimum winning coalition; this, in turn,
will cause the narrowly targeted formal welfare to shift to median voters. The following
hypothesis can thus be deduced:
H2: The higher the level of democracy, the more formal social welfare will be targeted towards
median voters instead of narrow groups.
The relationship between legislature and democracy on social welfare
When it comes to democratic regimes, it is widely accepted that legislatures can be used
to hold leaders accountable; it is also well known that their relationship with the execu-
tive branch aﬀects important political and economic outcomes.21 Unlike in
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democracies, legislatures were often marginalized in the study of policies in authoritar-
ian regimes however – due to the perception of them having no substantial impact.22
That is, in authoritarian regimes democratic institutions – constitutions, legislatures,
elections and political parties – exist either only for window-dressing purposes, to
reinforce a dictator’s position through demonstrating invincibility (with overwhelming
victories), gathering information on potential opponents or detecting lower-level cor-
ruption.23 However, when it comes to deciding the speciﬁc form of policies, the legis-
lature in authoritarian regimes is often not treated as being a meaningful point of
analysis. That is, because they exist only for dictators then their main perceived function
is to rubber stamp government-proposed legislation – while they can be suspended
anytime they challenge the government. From this perspective, obstruction of author-
itarian executives is unlikely, infrequent and inconsequential.
However, often noted as “consultative authoritarianism” or “authoritarianism with
binding legislature”24, authoritarian legislatures are increasingly being portrayed now
on the basis of more nuanced views. Evidence drawn from various locations shows
that, when it comes to legislative amendments and reversals, performance varied signiﬁ-
cantly between countries; whether a regime is ruled by a collective executive or not is an
important factor herein.25 Similarly, nomination procedures, competitiveness and the
level of professionalism of the legislature vary across authoritarian regimes – and
they aﬀect the speciﬁc forms taken of co-optation strategies too.26
As for the eﬀect of the legislature on social welfare, students of authoritarian insti-
tutions have demonstrated that it can be a place in which policy compromises are orga-
nized through concessions.27 For instance, the legislature can be used to buy support
from political elites and citizens using both private and public goods.28 This is particu-
larly more likely if dictators cannot generate rents from natural resources (as in oil-rich
nations), but depend instead on revenues garnered through domestic investment and
growth.29 Under these circumstances, the legislature is not a venue where autocrats
can just unilaterally adjust policies regarding private and public goods as they wish.
Various organized groups, for example trade unions or religious leaders, who are coop-
erating with the dictator will seek more concessions, whereas opposition ones will ask
for more median voter-oriented public goods given their lack of access to state
resources. And, as long as there are competitive elections, not all ruling-party legislators
are safe from potential defeat, so some can – similar to their democratic counterparts –
use the legislature for position-taking, credit-claiming and advertising.30
However what is still lacking in the literature is a clear understanding of the speciﬁc
institutional arrangements under which the legislature can prioritize public goods, such
as social welfare. Among other things, the potential eﬀect of two political institutions
with wider relevance can be identiﬁed: presidential structure and majoritarian electoral
rule. Drawing from the theories of democratic countries, the following expectations can
be derived in relation to social welfare.
With respect to the presidential structure, it has been accepted that in presidential
democracies, both the president and legislators are guaranteed to remain in power
for a ﬁxed term of oﬃce. Hence, within a given term, neither side can be fundamentally
checked by threatening each other’s political life. Resonating greater levels of legislator
independence, higher levels of legislative activism by individual legislators have been
reported in presidential democracies than in parliamentary ones.31 Moreover, it has
been claimed that presidential democracies yield more points of access, a space for
new policy ideas and higher levels of transparency too.32 This policy environment
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can serve as a breeding ground for legislators who seek to maximize their political
chances by venturing into new popular areas, such as the greater promotion of social
welfare. And, ceteris paribus, the policy environment will become more favourable as
the level of democracy advances.
Drawing insights from this, I argue that the degree of separation of powers should be
approached along a continuous scale for both authoritarian and democratic regimes. In
other words, it can be said that the extent to which the separation of powers principle is
eﬀective can vary between authoritarian legislatures (just like it can vary between
diﬀerent stages of democracies – in other words, democratic transition and consolida-
tion). Connected with this, the greater independence of the legislature should be posi-
tively related to its more active prioritization of social welfare issues. The following
hypothesis can thus be derived:
H3-a: The higher the level of democracy, the more the legislative branch will contribute to
formal social welfare than the executive branch will under a presidential structure.
As for the majoritarian electoral rules, studies based on the experiences of democratic
countries show why we are expected to observe convergence towards median voter-
oriented policies. First, through a mechanical and psychological effect, Duverger’s
Law expects majoritarian electoral rules such as ﬁrst-past-the-post to lead to two-
party systems; second, Anthony Down’s theory of party convergence predicts two
key parties to converge on issues favoured by median voters to maximize their electoral
fortune.33 Similar to the effect of a presidential structure, I approach the policy-conver-
gence effect under the majoritarian electoral rule as varying across different levels of
democracy. Namely, along with the increasing importance of free elections and the
freedom of media, I expect to see a stronger degree of median voter-orientation
among legislators who are constantly under electoral pressure. And, given the
median-voter-friendly nature of social welfare beneﬁts I put forward the following
hypothesis:
H3-b: The higher the level of democracy, the more the legislative branch will prioritize formal
social welfare over other issues under majoritarian electoral rules.
As I have pointed out, some formal social welfare tends to be targeted to narrow groups
that are likely to be highly organized or geographically concentrated – for example,
healthcare for public school teachers or farmers’ pensions. And, based on previous
empirical ﬁndings in welfare studies, welfare beneﬁts with a universal appeal tend to
have higher visibility among the general public.34 In light of this, if social welfare
beneﬁts themselves are distinguished between ones targeting median voters and
narrow groups, we should see the following trend along with the deepening of
democracy:
H3-c: The higher the level of democracy, the more formal social welfare initiated by the legis-
lative branch will be targeted towards median voters instead of narrow groups under majoritar-
ian electoral rule.
From the perspective that individual legislators can increasingly play crucial roles in leg-
islative saliency of social welfare issues, it is imperative to understand which speciﬁc
legislators are more or less likely to do so – and whether that is conditioned on the
level of democracy. After all, even if all legislators differ from the executive branch in
that they are constantly under electoral pressure, their social backgrounds, previous
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experiences and ideological spectrums vary substantially. Based on previous ﬁndings in
welfare studies, we can derive the following expectations from legislators’ afﬁliated
party, career background, gender, elected level and party status.
First, one of the most established ﬁndings in social policy scholarship is that parti-
sanship matters. The power resources theory tells us that the strength of the labour
movement and of left-wing parties are known as the key factors driving welfare expan-
sion.35 From this, we can expect legislators aﬃliated with left-leaning parties are more
likely to push for social welfare issues than those connected to right-leaning ones are.
Second, gender is another important aspect. Existing works suggest that female poli-
ticians tend to be more oriented towards care and compassion for vulnerable groups like
children and families, to promote education and health, and more likely to pass
measures that beneﬁt these marginalized people.36 Therefore, female legislators
should be more likely to focus on social welfare issues than their male counterparts are.
Third, which level a legislator was elected to should also matter. Korea has had a two-
tiered electoral system – one party level and one district level – during both democratic
and authoritarian rule. Considering that proportional representation electoral rules
tend to lead to larger welfare states, speciﬁcally by incentivizing politicians to
promote inclusive nationwide interests37, legislators elected at the party level by pro-
portional representation electoral rules should promote social welfare more than
their district-elected colleagues do.
Fourth, we can also derive an expectation from the status of a legislator’s aﬃliated
party. Authoritarian welfare research has shown that, in the context of electoral author-
itarianism, opposition parties tend to prioritize public goods more than the ruling party
does – given the former’s lack of access to the necessary state resources with which to
target particular groups.38 Although the resource-access gap is not as large for more
democratized countries, it still exists. Therefore, ceteris paribus, opposition party
members are more likely to focus on social welfare.
From these prior expectations, it is clear that being left-wing, female, party-elected,
and aﬃliated with opposition party is positively associated with prioritizing social
welfare. However, the key focus of this article is on how each legislator trait varies in
relation to the level of democracy. Following the expectation derived from the major-
itarian electoral rule, I anticipate seeing all legislators converge on prioritizing more
social welfare irrespective of their individual characteristics. Therefore, in light of the
previous expectations, the following hypothesis can be derived:
H4: under the majoritarian electoral rule, deepening of democracy will make legislators prior-
itize social welfare issues in general. But this eﬀect will be particularly pronounced for male,
ruling party, party-tier, right-leaning legislators who do not usually prioritize social welfare
issues compared to female, opposition party, district-tier, left-leaning legislators.
Korean context and data
Korea is an ideal case to test the four speciﬁed hypotheses, for several reasons: variations
in the level of democracy over time; the continuous experience of presidentialism as well
as majoritarian electoral rules; and, analytical advantages coming from the bill sponsor-
ship record – which exists through the whole period of observation.
In understanding Korea’s democratic experiences, several critical junctures can be
pointed out. The country was colonized by the Empire of Japan for the ﬁrst half of
the twentieth century and then ﬁnally liberated in 1945. After three years of US
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trusteeship, Korea held its ﬁrst-ever election in 1948. Then what followed came close to
“competitive authoritarianism”39, lasting until 1987 – on the one hand competitive elec-
tions existed but, on the other, presidents occasionally came to and maintained power
through rigged elections, military coups and/or by removing term limits. The forward
progress and back-pedalling of democratic levels during the authoritarian period is
reﬂected in the scores measuring democracy in Figure 1. Even if 1987 marks the ﬁrst
sustained democratic transition with mass enfranchisement and a free-and-fair election
(although 1948 saw the ﬁrst mass enfranchisement, the democracy was short-lived), it
was not until 2008 that Korea would pass Huntington’s two turn-over test (1991) and
‘consolidate’ its democracy.
Here, the article examines an original dataset that is based on the full universe of
sponsored social welfare bills in Korea between 1948 and 2016. As pointed out, both
the executive and legislative branch can propose bills in Korea. In the case of legislative
branch-proposed ones, these can be divided into individual legislator-submitted ones
and head of the standing committee-submitted ones. In the case of legislator-initiated
bills (also known as private members’ bills), each sponsoring legislator must have the
support (co-sponsorship) of ten or more members of the National Assembly.40And,
there is no upper limit to the number of co-sponsors. Considering that legislator-
initiated bills have been the dominant form within the legislative branch (making up
more than 95% thereof), the ensuing analyses will be primarily conducted based on
them.
The original dataset used here consists of roughly 60,000 submitted bills (in the years
between 1948 and 2016). Speciﬁcally, 6,259 and 50,130 bills were submitted during the
authoritarian and democratic periods of rule in Korea respectively. The whole dataset
was collected from the legislation search engine41, and coded as “welfare” if the title
and the key changes of a bill in the oﬃcial summary section (the opening lines)
include one of the following contents described in Table 1.42 In the case of a bill includ-
ing both welfare and non-welfare related changes, it was coded as either welfare or non-
welfare based on the primary emphasis in the bill’s introduction. Such coding makes
both the welfare and non-welfare categories mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive.
Taking a cue from previous ﬁndings that formal welfare with a universal appeal tend
to resonate particularly well with median voters43, a distinction is made based on the
universalistic or particularistic nature of welfare. It is coded as “particularistic” if a
beneﬁt is catered to “organized group(s)” and/or speciﬁc “geographical constituent
(s)” such as teachers, military, civil servants, politicians, farmers or business organiz-
ations.44 A welfare bill is coded as “universalistic”, meanwhile, if the beneﬁt is provided
to median voters or the marginalized, many of whom tend to be non-organized and
non-geographical targets – such as children, the elderly, the disabled and women.
Table 1. Categories of formal social welfare.
Social Welfare
Categories Speciﬁc Bill Contents
Social security: health insurance, pension, accident insurance, employment insurance, long-term care
insurance
Public assistance income maintenance, emergency aid, national compensation, support for the disabled,
support for refugees and immigrants, minimum income
Social services childcare, elderly care, juvenile care, mother/women care, hygiene and safety, medical
protection and social protection, housing, education, labour welfare
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Coding in this way, the proportion of welfare bills was 21% (from the noted total overall
number of approximately 60,000) while universal welfare ones made up 88% of those
welfare bills during the period of observation (see the online appendix for the detailed
conceptual distinction and examples).
Before getting into the analysis, it needs to be pointed out that not all welfare bills are
created equal. Speciﬁcally, if we consider the direction and signiﬁcance of each welfare
bill it should be noted that social policy ones sponsored during authoritarian periods
can be about rolling back social welfare beneﬁts or expanding insigniﬁcant ones just
for signalling purposes. Bearing this in mind, I sampled 500 social welfare bills from
each period to check whether those introduced during the authoritarian periods were
more trivial and more likely to be about retrenchment. I coded the substantiality and
direction of each bill according to the coding schemes employed in the previous
works to distinguish social policy bills (signiﬁcance: trivial or signiﬁcant45; direction:
retrenchment or expansion46). The results show that submitted social policy bills are
mostly about expansion (94%) and are indeed signiﬁcant (93%); there is no systematic
diﬀerence between the two periods.
Analysis
Testing the four hypotheses
The four speciﬁed hypotheses on expected legislative patterns regarding social welfare
issues are tested here using logistic regressions. Model 1 tests H1, which expects that as
democratization proceeds, more legislative attention will be directed towards social
welfare issues in general. Model 2 is conﬁned to social welfare bills only, and tests
H2, which posits that higher levels of democratization are positively related to universal
(rather than particularistic) welfare. Furthermore, Model 3 adds an interaction eﬀect
between the democratization level and the entity of origin of bill submission – the
executive branch or legislative branch – and examines whether individual legislators
are increasingly playing an important legislative role in pushing the social welfare
agenda in general (Model 3-a) and universal welfare one in particular (Model 3-b).
Finally, Model 4 tests the interaction eﬀect of four individual legislators’ character-
istics—party ideology, gender, elected tier, and party status (ruling/opposition party)
and democracy levels on social welfare agenda setting.
The outcome variable is binary (0/1) for all three models: Model 1, Model 3-a, Model
4 being welfare (1) or non-welfare (0); Model 2 and Model 3-b being universal welfare
(1) or particularistic welfare (0). The predictor variable of interest is the level of democ-
racy (continuous, from 0 to 1) measured as a Polyarchy score for Model 1 and 2, the
entity of bill sponsorship (cabinet 0, individual legislators 1, and head of the standing
committee 2) for Model 3, and four legislator characteristics for Model 4: legislators’
gender (female 1, male 0); elected level (party 1, district 0); ideological spectrum of legis-
lators’ aﬃliated party (0 centre-right, 1 centre-left, 2 left, 3 others47); and the party’s
status in the legislature (opposition 0, ruling party 1).
Other variables used as control ones draw from legislative studies, authoritarian
welfare and the political contexts of Korea. They are: i) electoral cycle (non-electoral
cycle 0, from ‘a year before an election day’ to ‘the election day’ 1); ii) gross domestic
product per capita (continuous, logged); iii) population size (continuous, logged; iv)
type of legislative initiative (enactment 0, amendment 1); v) the total number of
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submitted bills in each legislative session (continuous). The logistic regression results
are based on robust standard errors, and they are reported in the parentheses.
Hypotheses 1 and 2
Based onModel 1, it can be said that the level of democracy is positively related to prior-
itizing welfare bills (Table 2). Moving from the lowest to highest democracy level, the
predicted probability of a bill concerning welfare more than quadruples – from 5%
to 24% (Figure 2). In contrast, if a simple binary distinction is used based on the
year 1987 (before: authoritarian; after: democracy), the likelihood of a submitted bill
being concerned with social welfare moves to a much lesser extent–from 9% to 22%.
Moreover, considering that there is a substantial within-regime-type variation in the
sponsored welfare bill proportion per year (from 0 to 19% during authoritarian rule and
from 5 to 27% during the democratic era) then prioritization of social welfare should be
understood from the perspective of a continuous democracy scale existing. Seeing it in
this way allows for a more nuanced understanding of these events, instead of glossing
them over by focussing only on the regime type. This pattern clearly diverges from the
Korean welfare state literature which often draws sharp distinctions between authoritar-
ian and democratic regime periods by labelling the former “developmental welfare
state/productivist regime” and the latter “inclusive welfare state” based on social soli-
darity, universality and with redistributive implications.48
Model 2 shows that H2 is also conﬁrmed, in line with the expected prediction. A sub-
mitted welfare bill is substantially more likely to be universalistic in nature – and thus
Table 2. Logistic regression results by all political actors.
All actors submitted bills (cabinet, committee heads, legislators)
Model 1
(welfare or
not)
Model 2
(universalistic or
particularistic welfare)
Model 3−a
(welfare or
not)
Model 3−b
(universalistic or
particularistic welfare)
Democracy Level 2.45***
(0.13)
2.36***
(0.27)
2.01***
(0.17)
2.48***
(0.32)
Bill Sponsor (base:
cabinet) Legislator
0.53***
(0.35)
0.38***
(0.09)
−0.38**
(0.17)
2.56***
(0.67)
others 0.26***
(0.04)
0.29**
(0.13)
0.16
(0.20)
−1.08***
(0.40)
Democracy Level*Bill
Sponsor (base: cabinet)
Legislator
1.23***
(0.23)
−2.83***
(0.87)
Others 0.15
(0.27)
2.08***
(0.59)
Electoral Cycle 0.05**
(0.02)
0.16**
(0.07)
0.44*
(0.02)
0.16**
(0.07)
Legislation Type 0.01
(0.03)
0.013
(0.86)
0.01
(0.03)
0.0008
(0.08)
Total Bills per Session 0.00011
(0.00025)
0.000028
(0.000055)
0.00027
(0.00025)
0.000024***
(0.000057)
Population Size −1.35***
(0.38)
−2.13**
(0.86)
−1.74***
(0.38)
−0.49
(0.97)
GDP Capita 0.38***
(0.09)
0.59***
(0.20)
0.46***
(0.09)
0.25**
(0.23)
Constant 16.6
(5.82)
31.52***
(13.21)
22.99*** (5.86) 5.81**
(15.09)
Number of Observations 56,389 12,067 56,389 12,067
Notes: (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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concern median voters and the marginalized – than it is particularistic – the predicted
probability moves from 48% to 89%. These two patterns clearly resonate with the devel-
opment of social welfare in Korea. On the one hand, the lower level of democracy
during the authoritarian period features the underdevelopment of income-maintenance
programmes and social services, as well as low overall state expenditure on social
welfare. Oftentimes, the role of income-maintenance programmes was fulﬁlled
through other discretionary beneﬁts – which were not part of formal social welfare –
targeting only particular regions or groups. Often labelled as “surrogate social policy”
or “social protection by other means”, these include corporate welfare, occupational
pensions, or agriculture subsidies.49
On the other hand, evidence from the previous literature shows that when formal
social welfare was adopted it was mainly for the key supporters of presidents. In com-
bination with a long-term strategy – namely legitimization through economic growth –
short-term strategies are also needed to pre-empt potential challenges and threats. As is
clear from the cross-national evidence, the dictator’s elite supporters – rather than the
mass public – pose the primary challenge to the governing power; in four out of ﬁve
cases, dictators were ousted from power by government insiders.50 In this sense, with
its transparency, predictability and irreversibility, formal social welfare was a crucial
means for Korean dictators to show their commitment to their core supporters. There-
fore, it is not surprising to note that, throughout the authoritarian period in Korea, most
key formal welfare beneﬁts were directed/prioritized towards civil servants, the military
and teachers. Speciﬁcally, in Korea government pension schemes were ﬁrst introduced
to the military and civil servants in 1957 and 1960 respectively; they saw increases in the
levels of beneﬁt enjoyed and of coverage during the 1970s and 1980s meanwhile.
National health insurance ﬁrst started with employees of large companies in 1977,
and afterwards moved to civil servants and private school teachers too.
To examine how this pattern is reﬂected in the welfare-speciﬁc categories, I broke
down each social welfare bill based on the subject of ‘key beneﬁciaries’. This resulted
in 123 categories, which include a wide range of individuals such as victims of disasters,
veterans, refugees, the disabled, foreign workers, women, consumers, depositors with
banks, farmers/agriculture industry, ﬁshermen/ﬁshing industry, small and medium
enterprises, small retailers, teachers, soldiers and the like. By examining the proportion
of speciﬁc welfare categories for particular subjects (from the total welfare bills sub-
mitted during each of the two regime periods), Table 3 below lists for who a particular
Figure 2. Marginal eﬀect of democratic levels on social welfare bills (left: continuous scale; right: dichotomous
scale).
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social welfare measure was prioritized in one regime as compared to in the other.
Echoing the idea of a minimum winning coalition by De Mesquita and others51, civil
servants, the military and teachers tended to be prioritized signiﬁcantly more during
the authoritarian period (making up 30 to 40% of the total welfare bills); median
voters and the marginalized received more social policy attention during the democratic
period, meanwhile. Moreover, it also conﬁrms the key point of the developmental
welfare state52, by showing that three aspects of welfare – education, health and com-
pensating for work-related injuries – known to be more growth-friendly were promoted
during the authoritarian regime period.
Hypothesis 3
Models 1 and 2 are heavily based on the expectations drawn from previous scholarship,
and the results clearly show that the Korean case does not deviate from these. Model 3 is
based on an original hypothesis that the article has formulated out of authoritarian leg-
islature, presidential studies, and electoral studies and the results clearly add an inter-
esting nuance to the relationship between social welfare promotion (both degree and
type) and the level of democracy. To begin with, from the political logic of separation
of powers in presidential structure, Hypothesis 3-a predicted that the legislative branch
under presidential regime will increasingly contribute to the agenda setting of social
welfare along with the deepening of democracy. To examine if this is the case,
Figure 3 depicts the role of individual legislators in welfare bill sponsorship over
time. It shows the percentage of total welfare bills sponsored by particular actors in
given years, and the trend clearly indicates that legislators have gained importance
after the democratic transition – being behind more than 90% of all social welfare
bills after 2011. Moreover, along with the progress of democracy in Korea, legislative
constraints have concomitantly been minimized (the correlation coeﬃcient between
the two indicators described in Figure 1 is 0.96 and statistically signiﬁcant at 1
percent level) while their legislative activities have substantially increased (going from
16 sponsored bills in 1948 to 4,624 such items in 2016).
In addition, the within-regime variation should not escape our attention. Similar to
the importance of applying a continuous democracy scale for understanding the welfare
orientation of legislators, their legislative contribution over time can be understood
Table 3. Diﬀerent targets of social welfare bills by regime type.
Authoritarian Democracy
Authoritaran Welfare Civil Servant pension/welfare 19.48% 1.57%
Military pension/welfare 15.73% 0.73%
Teachers pension/welfare 2.82% 0.57%
Work injury 3.99% 1.07%
Equivalent Health Insurance 4.22% 2.84%
Damage Compensation 9.62% 12.75%
Education 4.93% 6.94%
Democratic welfare Consumer 0.00% 3.71%
Child welfare 0.47% 5.25%
Gender welfare 0.70% 6.19%
Elderly welfare 0.47% 2.28%
Disabled welfare 0.23% 3.45%
Youth welfare 0.47% 5.25%
Unemployment insurance 0.00% 2.04%
1246 J. SHIM
better in light of variances in democratic level at diﬀerent points in times. Even during
the democratic period, legislators undeniably have played a more signiﬁcant role in the
course of moving from the democratic transition (1987–2008) to consolidation period
(2008–2016). And, with regards to the authoritarian regime period, the Korean case
shows that there was a sudden plummeting of legislators’ contributions to social
welfare bills between 1972 and 1979. This change is not coincidental, since 1972 is
the year when President Park violated the democratic principle by imposing the
Yushin Constitution – reﬂected in the change of Polyarchy score from 0.3 to 0.2 in
Figure 1 above. Judging by these patterns, we can conﬁrm Hypothesis 3-a. Considering
that students of East Asian welfare states have emphasized the importance of the execu-
tive branch (particularly bureaucrats) or expert institutions53, ﬁndings here clearly
point to include the legislative branch as a key political actor.
Figure 3 clearly shows the shift in legislators’ welfare bill contribution – vis-à-vis the
other two initiators of bills – to the social welfare agenda at diﬀerent levels of democ-
racy. However, how much they actually contributed to the whole social agenda and the
degree of their preference for welfare are two diﬀerent things. In other words, they can
increasingly contribute to the social welfare agenda as the level of democracy increases
but end up being less pro-welfare themselves. For this, the preference dimension is sep-
arately tested with Model 3-a and 3-b in Table 1.
The results (Model 3-a) show that legislators are not necessarily more prone to pro-
moting social welfare than the cabinet. However, the interaction term shows that legis-
lators are much more sensitive to increasing democracy levels (compared to cabinet)
when it comes to promoting social welfare. That is, as can be demonstrated from
Figure 4 below (left-hand side), the likelihood that a submitted bill concerns welfare
increases both for legislator- and cabinet-initiated bills. However, the conditional
eﬀect is strong enough to make legislators to appear more pro-welfare in general. It
is particularly noteworthy that the democratic level 0.5 forms a point of divergence
when the degree of welfare prioritization between cabinet- and legislator-submitted
bills crosses over. As is clear from the Polyarchy score in Figure 1 earlier, this coincides
with the time period of the democratic transition. Therefore, we can also conﬁrm
Hypothesis 3-b.
Figure 3. Welfare bill contribution by actor.
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As for the universality of welfare tested in Model 3-b (Hypothesis 3-c), interestingly
enough, the direction is completely reversed from Model 3-a. Statistical results tell us
that legislators are more likely to focus on universal welfare than the cabinet but, at
the same time, the latter is much more sensitive to the eﬀect of democratization.
This diﬀerence is clearly manifested in Figure 4 (right-hand side). That is, we can see
that legislators have constantly and clearly supported universal welfare more than the
cabinet – regardless of democratic level.
However, when we shift our attention to the direction of change occurring along
with the progression of democracy, we observe a contrasting image. Welfare bills spon-
sored by both the cabinet and legislators merge in their universalistic character by a dra-
matic shift of cabinet welfare bills from particularistic to universalistic—nearing the
highest levels of democracy, the universality of welfare between legislators and
cabinet is indistinguishable. While Model 1 and Model 2 tell us the importance of
approaching social welfare from diﬀerent degrees of democracy, an important insight
we can glean from Model 3 is to add information about who supported a particular
type of welfare. Namely here there are high levels of association between legislators
and universal welfare on the one hand, and cabinet members and particularistic
welfare on the other. Moreover it also shows that cabinet bills have substantially
shifted their focus from particularistic to universal welfare between the two regime
types, while the emphasis has not changed much for legislators under either. Combined
with the results fromModels 1 and 2, this indicates that legislators have constantly been
more concerned with universal welfare – but the degree to which they prioritize social
welfare issues in general (out of their total legislative eﬀorts) rose after the democratic
transition, when serious multiparty competition now came into being. Furthermore, it
also conﬁrms the previous observation that welfare beneﬁts for the military, teachers,
politicians and civil servants were directly controlled by the president (in the form of
cabinet bills) during authoritarian periods. However, this lost its importance after the
democratic transition.
To begin with, Model 4-a tested the eﬀect of legislator attributes on social welfare
prioritization (hypothesis 4) without interacting with the levels of democracy
(Table 4). The result shows that being a female legislator, elected at the party level
and aﬃliated with an opposition party are important positive predictors of a bill sub-
mitted concerning welfare. This is all in line with the expectations derived from pre-
vious works. However, in contrast to the established welfare state literature, the
Figure 4. Marginal eﬀect of democratic levels on social welfare bills by sponsoring entity (left: social welfare or
others; right: universal or particularistic welfare).
1248 J. SHIM
known ideological spectrum of the legislators’ party manifests no diﬀerence. This is not
completely surprising, since key political divisions have not clearly formed around
social welfare issues in Korea.54 For instance, empirical evidence drawn from mass
opinion surveys, public voting patterns, party manifestoes, legislative speeches and leg-
islative voting demonstrates mixed results in that income, occupation status, and views
on social welfare issues have not been consistent predictors in pubic voting or legislative
behaviour to date.55
Insofar as gender, elected level and party status are concerned, separate regressions
are conducted by adding an interaction term of each legislator character – to investigate
how the eﬀect has changed across diﬀerent levels of democracy (Hypothesis 4). In line
with the prediction, for all three variables that turned out to be eﬀective in Model 4-a,
we can observe a convergence towards more social welfare bill sponsorship. This can be
inferred from both the negative direction of interaction terms in Models 4-b, 4-c and 4-
d as well as from the predicted probability changes at diﬀerent democracy levels illus-
trated in Figure 5 below. That is, being male, a ruling-party member or district-level
elected are all positively aﬀected by the impact of increasing levels of democracy on
Table 4. Logistic regression results by legislators.
Legislator submitted bills
Model 4-a
(welfare or not)
Model 4-b
(welfare or not)
Model 4-c
(welfare or not)
Model 4-d
(welfare or not)
Democracy Level 2.97***
(0.22)
3.06***
(0.23)
2.56***
(0.25)
3.15***
(0.23)
Democracy Level*Gender −1.73**
(0.74)
Democracy Level*Party Status 1.35***
(0.49)
Democracy Level*Elected Tier −1.28**
(0.61)
Electoral Cycle 0.03
(0.03)
0.03
(0.026)
0.03
(0.026)
0.03
(0.026)
Legislation Type 0.01
(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)
Total Bills per Session 0.000049*
(0.000027)
0.000047*
(0.000027)
0.000041*
(0.000027)
0.000035*
(0.000027)
Population Size −2.42***
(0.47)
−2.35***
(0.47)
−2.53***
(0.47)
−2.37***
(0.48)
GDP Capita 0.49***
(0.11)
0.47***
(0.11)
0.55***
(0.11)
0.51***
(0.11)
Party Ideology (base: centre-right)
Centre-left
−0.01
(0.03)
−0.02
(0.03)
−0.05*
(0.03)
−0.009
(0.03)
Left 0.04
(0.07)
0.06
(0.07)
−0.11
(0.07)
0.13*
(0.07)
Others −0.19**
(0.08)
−0.19**
(0.08)
−0.28***
(0.08)
−0.26***
(0.08)
Gender 0.56***
(0.13)
1.89***
(0.57)
0.55***
(0.03)
0.55***
(0.03)
Party Status −0.08**
(0.03)
−0.08***
(0.03)
−1.03***
(0.39)
−0.09***
(0.03)
Elected Tier 0.3***
(0.03)
0.30***
(0.03)
0.51***
(0.03)
1.51***
(0.48)
Constant 34.54***
(7.20)
33.34***
(7.03)
36.00***
(7.21)
29.55***
(7.27)
Number of Observations 40,942 40,942 40,942 40,942
Notes: (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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social welfare, more so than for those who are female, opposition party members or
party-level elected. As a result, by 2016, the gap regarding social welfare promotion
had been signiﬁcantly narrowed. Particularly, the indistinguishable gap between oppo-
sition and ruling party members resonates with previous ﬁndings that competition
between parties has resulted of late in a “race to the top” and a “ratcheting up” of
welfare policy reform promises in Korea.56
For the sake of the robustness of the ﬁndings that I have presented so far, I removed
each social welfare category described in Table 1 to examine if anything changes (i.e.,
this is not included here to preserve space). The results show none of the key
ﬁndings that I previously demonstrated are hereafter altered.
Concluding remarks
The article has examined the legislative prioritization of social welfare issues in Korea in
the years from 1948 to 2016, with the whole universe of submitted bills being taken into
account. The following three key ﬁndings stand out: First, conﬁrming previous scholar-
ship, the level of democracy is positively related to the sponsorship of more social
welfare bills in general and of universalistic ones in particular. However, the evidence
clearly suggests that this relationship can be better understood from a continuous-
scale perspective instead of from a dichotomous one. Second, going further, the
article has examined the relationship between democratic deepening and the role of
the legislature in prioritizing social welfare issues and contributing to its overall saliency
in light of two political institutions with global relevance: presidential structure and
majoritarian electoral rule. On the one hand, and drawing insights from the separation
Figure 5. Marginal eﬀect of democratic levels on social welfare bills by legislators’ attributes (left: gender; right:
party status; bottom: elected tier).
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of powers logic pointed out in presidential studies, the article has shown the increasing
role of the legislative branch in prioritizing social welfare as occurring in tandem with
rising levels of democracy. On the other, and building on the Downsian expectation of
what happens under majoritarian electoral rules, the article has demonstrated the
increasing policy orientation towards median-voter-friendly social policies unfolding
together with rising levels of democracy. This has clearly manifested itself in the
form of the increasing welfare-orientation of legislators, irrespective of their gender,
elected tier (party or district), or their aﬃliated party status (to the opposition or the
ruling party).
The article adds to the recent approach that tries to understand the role of legislatures
in social welfare-promotion within authoritarian and democratic regimes from an inte-
grated theoretical framework perspective. However, moving beyond this it adds to the
authoritarian welfare debate by showing how two institutional eﬀects often associated
with democracies – the separation of powers in presidentialism and median voter-conver-
gence under majoritarian electoral rules – can be understood from an integrated perspec-
tive: the higher the level of democracy, the more clearly visible these eﬀects will be. To
demonstrate this point, I focused on Korea between 1948 and 2016 considering its
three ideal conditions: i) has been under presidential structure and majoritarian electoral
rule, ii) has seen substantial changes both in the level of democracy and the degree of
social welfare agenda setting, and iii) has consistently allowed both legislative and execu-
tive branch to sponsor bills. The article follows examples of previous works on authori-
tarian legislatures57 in the sense that the careful examination of one country’s political
system can lay important foundations for broader theoretical claims being generated.
Finally, I want to suggest two potential avenues for future research. First, as made
clear from this article, successful and unsuccessful legislative attempts should both be
analysed together to gain a broader sense of how particular social welfare legislation
came into being. This is especially pertinent if the goal is to understand the preferences
of particular political actors; analysing only successful attempts can clearly bias one’s
results, since they may be only the tip of the iceberg. Going beyond a simple aggregation
of failed attempts, future works can distinguish between these – since many of them
tend to aﬀect the successful ones either directly (by making some parts of unsuccessful
bills be included in the eventually successful ones) or indirectly (by creating a bidding
pressure during the legislative’s deliberation stage). Relatedly, second, formal social
welfare itself can be broken down into diﬀerent categories and closely examined by
looking at which types are more likely to succeed, who key supporting actors were
and what the underlying motivates have been.
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